Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:
Connecting Research and Policy

Working Memos[1]

January 25th, 2008

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Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): The Case of Mothers in Northern Uganda

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Background

During the twenty year conflict in northern Uganda, between 24,000-38,000 children and 28,000-28,000 adults have been abducted and forced to be laborers, soldiers and 'wives' to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Twenty-four percent are women and girls.[3] In 2003, thousands of women and children were released during the height of a military operation and returned to Uganda. Up to 5,000 LRA are thought to still be at large in the DRC, including upwards of 3,000 women and children. In 2006, as part of a research project on justice, a team of Acholi researchers interviewed 147 mothers of children born in captivity in single structured qualitative interviews using snowball methods. All respondents live in internally displace persons camps.

Why this issue?

Mothers are a social group that has not figured widely in the DDR debate in northern Uganda or elsewhere. Yet a number of reintegration related concerns exist.

First, marriage is the most important socio-economic institution of support for mothers and children. However, cultural taboos regarding a mother's time in the 'bush' has made marriage on return difficult, leaving some extremely vulnerable to exploitation.

Second, there is a question of reunion with former LRA combatants, whom women and girls were forced to marry. In 2005, a number of high level commanders returned to Uganda in large groups and began searching for the women they had forced to be their 'wives' in the bush with the expectation of rejoining them. Currently, one former high ranking commander is living with an underage girl who was abducted at the age of 12 and served as his 'wife' while in captivity. By law, this is statutory rape, violating the terms of the Amnesty Act.

Third, there is also the question of children born in captivity and their identities. Young mother's often felt the identity of their children, and where they belonged, was one of the most pressing issues they face in reintegrating.

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[3] See Abducted. *The Lord's Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda*, Payson Centre, Human Rights Centre, International Centre for Transitional Justice 2007. This is the first attempt to quantify the numbers of persons abducted.

Finally, failing to address these needs could pose a security concern in the future. Some former wives have returned to the bush with their children, failing to integrate well. Children stigmatized as rebels have been observed as taking part in criminal activities.

Summary of Findings

- Over 90 percent of girls and women abducted by the LRA in our sample were forced into marriage. Of these, at least 73 percent continued to fight as soldiers even if 'married.' Findings showed that 'marriage' in the 'bush' provided some protection within the LRA by extending to women certain privileges based upon the rank of one's 'bush husband.' Women also learned important leadership skills that could be useful on return from captivity. However, it was also the site of violence for girls and women, who were raped, beaten, and tortured for breaking sexual and domestic codes of conduct in the LRA.

- Just over half of mothers returning from captivity choose to remain single, and struggle to make economic ends meet. Another 37 percent choose to remarry, although marriages to non-abducted persons tend not to last due to stigma related to time spent in captivity and social pressure on new husbands to force their wives out.

- Approximately 59 percent of mothers have knowledge that their 'bush husbands' are still alive and at large. Ninety seven percent stated that they are uninterested in reuniting with former LRA 'husbands.'

- A central recommendation is to ensure that program interventions address the rights of mothers and their children and in particular, protect them from forced reunion with LRA commanders; exploitation and to protect their rights of their children.

- Project interventions should build on the leadership skills of women in the bush, supporting diverse training and income generating projects but also encouraging the formation of peer support associations to advocate on their own behalf for their rights.

Life in Captivity

The majority of mothers in our sample were abducted when they were adolescents and 69 percent spent between 5-8 years in captivity. All mothers in the sample reported they had learned to use a gun, or at one point carried a gun. Seventy three percent described themselves as soldiers as well as 'housewives,' who had fought in either offensive or defensive battles against the UPDF, or participated in raids against civilians and in a few cases, committed atrocities against civilians. When asked what differences existed between their roles and that of boys or men, they reported that the division of labor and privileges was afforded based on marital status, gender, and military rank.

Married women could achieve a position of authority vis-à-vis lower ranking and unmarried boys or men, who were responsible not only for military operations but also domestic labor for themselves and the group at large. Women learned leadership skills in captivity, some became leaders of women and children groups that often temporarily

split from battalions during battle; others were commanders in charge of their own battalions, still others were trained in medicine, administration, business and market sales.

Unmarried boys and girls were responsible for the heaviest and most dangerous workloads such as carrying supplies or moving at the front of a military deployment in battle. Young boys and premenstrual girls acted as *ting-ting*, caregivers to young children. Following menstruation, young girls or women were immediately forced into marriage.

Of the 147 mothers in our study, 97 percent stated they were forced into marriage and to have sex against their will as soon as they menstruated. If they resisted they were beaten, tortured, and threatened with death. Commanders had first choice of which girls they wanted. At times girls were specifically reserved for members of the high command. Otherwise, girls were assigned to men of different ranks according to the brigade or group they were with.

Reintegration

Findings demonstrate that 36 percent of mothers have remarried or live in cohabitation with a man since returning from the 'bush.' While marriage between a formerly abducted person and a person within the community (the never abducted) does occur, it rarely results in a sustainable union. Three major reasons were given.

First, the woman is considered to come from a 'poor background', having participated (willingly or not) in fighting and massacre of civilians while with the LRA. She is deemed to be spiritually 'unclean' and marriage with such a person could result in misfortunes and illness within their families. Social pressure from family, relatives, or friends often leads a spouse to abandon his new partner. Some are forced to leave when their in-laws virtually torture them or their children.

A second reason why the marriages rarely result in sustainable unions is simply that spouses who had never experienced abduction or life in the 'bush' are unable to empathize or relate with those who did.

A third reason is the status of children. Respondents argued that their children born in the 'bush' were discriminated against in their new families, and often considered an economic burden or a threat that could potentially bring *cen* (vengeance of the dead) into the family.

Being unable to conceive, miscarriages, or the sudden death of infants is also blamed on *cen* 'got in the bush' and is thus considered by the clan to be a legitimate reason to 'chase' a woman from the home. Some respondents abandoned their children or left them with other family members rather than bring them into a new clan that does not welcome them.

Close to 55 percent of those in the study chose to remain or are single. Reasons for this included: the need to protect their children, their desire to first finish their education or vocational training, that they were waiting for their 'bush husbands' to return home (eight

percent stated they intended to reunite with their former spouse) or finally, that they had experienced too much trauma to consider marriage with anyone.

Only 3 percent of the mothers in the sample returned with their 'bush husband' and remained with him after return. The majority interviewed stated they had no intentions of reuniting with their former 'bush husbands'. However, a few expressed the willingness to reunite for the following reasons: they already had their children and felt they should stay together; they felt they had no other choice; and, a few stated that they have developed love for the husbands.

Improving DDR for Young Mothers / Recommendations

1. The DDR agreement under the agenda item 4 of the current peace talks should include ground rules for the reunion of former combatants and women who were forced to be their wives. Any process of reunion is transparent, voluntary, and agreed upon by all parties involved. To ensure this, it will require creating protection mechanisms in camps where 'bush husbands' will initially go and search for their 'wives' and children.

2. The security and protection of young mothers cannot be guaranteed from a traditional military or police approach. Given the sensitivity of these issues, it may require creating peer support networks so that mothers know they have rights and options other than reunion. These types of structures and systems can be built into the newly emerging human rights programs, income generation projects, and training centers in the north.

3. Commanders returning home might also be taught about the rights of young mothers. At the very least, provisions forbidding them from reuniting with under-age girls should be built into the law and enforced by the Government of Uganda.

4. An initiative for family tracing for the children whose father or mother died, returned, or is still in the bush should be developed to help resolve the question of the identity of children born in captivity.

5. A special compensation fund could be established to assist young mothers and their children. Where it is possible and desirable, elders should assist in individual cases to ensure compensation is made clan to clan. However, this should never be viewed as payment of bride price or *luk* (payment for children). The fund should be extended to include young mothers abandoned by military officers or who are struggling on their own.

6. Peer support groups and networks could be created to address rights and provide opportunities to young mothers to exercise the leadership skills acquired in the bush. This could include advocating on behalf of mothers and children as a victims group. Such peer support mechanisms could parallel income generation or training projects.

Political Uncertainty and Sustainable Peace: War-to-Peace Transitions, Institutional Change, and Third-Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution

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In recent years there has been a dramatic increase of international interventions in conflict resolution. Despite the rise in scholarly attention devoted to the subject, there are few inter-regional, intra-regional, and longitudinal comparisons that offer integrated answers to the following questions: (a) why are some internal armed conflict "easier" to resolve than others? And (b) why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence, when others fail with renewed eruptions of hostilities?

This proposition suggests that analyzing the balance of power between extremist and moderate actors makes it possible to answer both questions simultaneously.[4] The ideas developed here are a result of a Ph.D. qualitative research in four cases: Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mozambique. This report is divided in four sections. First, I discuss the three core premises. Second, I clarify why this proposition is important to improve our knowledge about war-to-peace transitions. Third, I try to bridge the gap between academic discussion and the practice of conflict resolution. Finally, I propose some ideas about the next steps in terms of scientific research.

Extremism, moderation, and issues of war-to-peace transitions

The model is based in three well-known premises used in comparative politics:

1. Instead of defining an internal armed conflict as an "anarchical" situation, I label it as a context characterized by political uncertainty. This uncertainty is the product of either a fighting about the institutions (political actors do not agree with the rules of the game) or institutional weakness (the existence of a gap between formal institutional constraints and actual political behavior).[5] The central point here is that "…without some means of resolving this uncertainty, strategic action is impossible, because the actors are unable to assess rationally the outcomes associated with their choice of strategies."[6] If conflict resolution is about creating

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[4] Usually, these questions are addressed separately. Scholars interested in the first question develop aspects such as the indivisibility of belligerents' interests (i.e. Posen, Kaufmann, etc.) and the emergence of "ripe moments" (Zartman, 1990; Clements, 1996; Mitchell, 1996). Regarding the second question, guarantees for belligerents (Walter, 1999; Wood) and spoilers' actions (Stedman, 1997) have been suggested as central points in the discussion. For the first question, see: Barry R. Posen. 1993. «The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict». *Survival* 1 printemps:; Christopher R. Mitchel. 1996. *Cutting Losses: Reflections On Appropriate Timing*. Institute for Analysis and Resolution (Working Paper). Fairfax (Virginia): George Mason University. On line. <http://icar.gmu.edu/wp_9_mitchell.pdf>. For the second question, see: Barbara F. Walter. 1997. «The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement». *International Organization* 51 3: Barbara F. Walter. 1999. «Designing Transitions from Civil War. Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace». *International Security* 24 1 (été):

[5] For a model, see: Steven Levitsky et María Murillo. 2006 *«Variation in Institutional Strength in Latin America: Causes and Implications».* City:

[6] Jack Knight. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53.

environments favouring peaceful political interactions, then political institutions matter.

2. Four types of actors are present in all uncertain contexts: Hard-liners and Soft-liners (into the government G), and Reformers and Radicals (into the opposition O).[7] The difference between moderates and extremists is risk aversion. Lack of information lead to "credible commitment" and "dilemma of security" problems, which in turn make it impossible to calculate risks.[8] In addition, in a world without institutions, political, economic, and strategic resources act as a constraint to strategic choice. The distribution of them determines the balance of power among actors. Given the fact that there are four kind of actors, a moderated and an extremist government (G_M and G_E) and an moderated and an extremist opposition (O_M and O_E), there are three theoretically possible balances of power (see figure 1): (a) favorable to G_E and O_E, or a "radicalized balance of power"; (b) favorable to G_M and O_M, or a "Ripe Moment"; (c) a mixture of these types, that is, a balance favorable either to G_E and O_M or G_M and O_E.[9] The configuration of the balance of power (among the different forces) affects the probabilities of success of third parties acting in war-to-peace transitions[10].

Figure 1
Possible Issues of War-to-Peace Transitions
(According to the Configuration of the Balance of Power)

3. A peace agreement is a political pact, that is, an exchange of guarantees to assure the protection of the negotiators' "vital interest." However, if some participants are insensitive to political uncertainty while others are averse to it, the type of agreement and the kind of guarantees, that is the kind of institutional reform agreed for the post-conflict period, is different if G_M bargains with O_M, than

[7] See, for example: Guillermo O'Donnell et Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Autoritharian Rule*. Baltimore et Londres: The John Hopkins University Press; Adam Przeworski. 1992. «The Games of Transition». Dans S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell and J. S. Valenzuela, dir., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

[8] For a discussion of credible commitment problems, see: James D. Fearon. 1994. «Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem». Communication, American Political Science Association, 2-5 septembre.; James D. Fearon. 1995. «Rationalist Explanations for War». *International Organization* 49 3:; James D. Fearon. 2004. «Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?». *Journal of Peace Research* 41 3:.

[9] For a discussion of "Ripe Moments", see: I. William Zartman. 1990. *La résolution de conflits en Afrique*. Paris: L'Harmattan; I. William Zartman. 2001. «The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments». *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1 1:

[10] I identify three possible issues of a war-to-peace transition. The first one is a resumption of war.

if G_E bargains with O_E. The reinforcement of both the system of representation (through the transformation of the armed opposition into a political party) and the Judiciary system reduce political uncertainty, make actors' decisions more predictable, favor cooperation and, subsequently, lead to a sustainable peace.[11] These reforms are usually linked to what Robert Dahl calls polyarchies (liberal representative democracies) and not to power-sharing regimes.[12]

Theoretical implications

Following these premises, scholars should be able to:

1. Identify "modes of war-to-peace" transitions, differentiated by the kind of negotiators (extremists or moderates), the risks of spoiling (internal total/ limited, external total/ limited[13]) and the kind of guarantees negotiated (power-sharing versus what I call "polyarchic guarantees").

2. Understand why some internal armed conflicts – those where G_M and O_M take control over the situation, are "easier" to resolve than others (where extremists prevail). One should be also able to understand why some peace agreements – those who include "polyarchic guarantees" are more effective in preventing new waves of violence while others (those who constraints power-sharing guaranties -, often fail impeding renewed eruptions of hostilities).

3. It is possible to avoid the (normative) discussion about "successes" and "failures" of international peace operations.[14] Peacekeeping can be defined as an activity that produces a temporary, exogenous and relative reduction of political incertitude. Peacebuilding is an activity that produces a permanent and endogenous reduction and contention of political uncertainty.

Bridging the gap between academic discussions and the practice of conflict resolution: What to do and How to do it?

According to Stedman, "to make a good diagnosis, policymakers must overcome organizational blinders that lead them to misread intentions and motivations."[15] In order to make what Stedman calls a "good diagnostic," third parties should proceed in two steps:

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[11] I acknowledge the fact that it is difficult to…. [unfinished footnote].

[12] For a definition of polyarchy, see: Robert A. Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*. New Haven et Londres: Yale University Press; Guillermo O'Donnell. 1994. «Delegative Democracies». *Journal of Democracy* 5 1 (janvier):. For a discussion about power sharing regimes, see: Donald Rothchild et Philip G. Roeder. 2005. «Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy». Dans P. G. Roeder and D. Rothchild, dir., *Sustainable Peace. Power and Democracy After Civil Wars*. Ithaca (New York): Cornell University Press.

[13] Stephen John Stedman. 1997. «Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes». *International Security* 22 2 (automne):; Marie-Joëlle Zahar. 2006. «Understanding the violence of insiders: Loyalty, custodians of peace, and the sustainability of conflict settlement». Dans E. Newman and O. Richmond, dir., *Challenges to Peacebuilding. Managing spoilers during conflict resolution*. Tokyo, New York, et Paris: United Nations University Press.

[14] See:George Downs et Stephen J. Stedman. 2002. «Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation». Dans S. J. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E. M. Cousens, dir., *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder et Londres: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[15] Stedman. «Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes». 7.

1. Recognizing who is moderate and who is extremist is the first, and probably the most important step. Extremists differ from moderates on four issues (which are also considered as indicators in my framework): (a) Mutual recognition (the moderate gives some legitimacy to its adversary); (b) Accepting the negotiation as a useful and valid strategic choice (extremist have some difficulties to view negotiation as a tool for conflict resolution); (c) Demands on the necessity to define the rules of the negotiation can bring us information about who is sensitive to political uncertainty; (d) Costly signals (i.e. an unilateral ceasefires) can also give information about the preferences of belligerents.

2. It is not enough to know who is willing to fight and who would like to reduce political uncertainty. It is also necessary to know who is able to do it. Studying the distribution of political resources (credibility, legitimacy), economic resources (symbiotic or parasitary economic extraction from the populace, and/or incursion of the belligerent into illegal economic activities), and strategic resources (fighters, arms, territorial control), is the second step of a "good diagnostic."

Third parties must recognize that:

1. The balance of power is a central variable because it determines what is possible and impossible in terms of peace. In a radicalized environment, an international intervention can be justified in humanitarian terms. However, pushing extremists to adopt polyarchic guaranties can lead to a catastrophic issue (e.g. Angola under the Bicesse Accords, 1991). Whereas polyarchy is linked to sustainable peace, it is also linked to moderated actors.

2. A balance of "power" does not refer solely to military or strategic resources. Political and economic resources matters, but perhaps what is most important, there is an interdependence between them.

Next Steps

1. My Ph.D. dissertation can be viewed an exploratory application of some concepts linked to path-dependency. For example, I have defined a war-to-peace transition as a process constituted by three "critical junctures": (t), the moment of the beginning of a pre-negotiation; (t + 1), the signature of a peace agreement, and (t + 2), the beginning of the institutional enforcement.[16] What is new here is not the three-phases frame (negotiation, implementation, post-conflict), but the idea that there "…are choice points when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives. Once a particular option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available.[17] Przeworski uses the image of logical trees. However, a more

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[16] A pact of peace is not only a means to stop a war, but also a tool in establishing peace in the long run. Subsequently, the success or failure in preventing new waves of violence depends, to an important extent, on the institutional framework created by the peace agreement.

[17] According to Przeworski, "Each strategic situation is characterized by the presence of particular political forces endowed with interests which involve different mixtures of conflict and coordination, by conditions which have generated by earlier actions and by conditions that are exogenous. Change from one conjuncture to another occurs as an outcome of actions pursued by actors. One can thus think of the entire process in terms of a logical tree, in which the knots are the particular conjunctures and branches represent the possibilities inherent in each conjuncture". Przeworski. «The Games of Transition». Dans dir., 7; James

systematic use of the path-dependency approach in the field of conflict resolution must be developed.

2. Indicators of extremism and moderation must be fine-tuned. My Ph.D. thesis is a good starting point, but more systematic research on, for example, degrees of extremism and moderation, could be very useful.

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Political Party Development: A New Peacebuilding Priority?

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My research shows that the specific context and history of post-war countries results in political parties and party systems that are different from those in non-conflict countries or established democracies. Post-war parties vary from strong ruling parties, to weak opposition parties, to soldiers-turned-politicians, among others. Post-war party systems are either much more fragmented or more dominant-authoritarian. Findings from several post-war countries also indicate that electoral competition, socioeconomic divisions and formal institutions are less important in explaining party and party system institutionalization than is commonly assumed. Instead, the specific party origins, conflict history and the post-war power configuration seem to have greater influence. Conclusions from this research challenge the assumptions of 'institutional engineering' of many post-war peacebuilding and democracy promotion initiatives and suggest the need for a more party-system specific approach.

Introduction

The importance of well-organized and responsive political parties for democratization is well-known. In contrast, there is much less understanding or attention for the role and functions of political parties in post-war peacebuilding. This is surprising because political parties and their –often stunted– development have been significant factors in fomenting tensions and triggering violence in Burundi, Rwanda, El Salvador, and many other countries. It is also striking because there is an assumption within the peacebuilding community that the organization of elections 'will do the trick' and restore peace, stability and legitimacy to war-torn societies. However, without functioning political parties to participate in elections, to design alternative political programs, and to ultimately take up the responsibilities of government, the organization of post-war elections makes little sense.

Unfortunately, there has been limited attention to the development of political parties and party systems in countries emerging from conflict.[18] Academic studies on party politics as well as policies for international party assistance do usually not address the specific conditions of post-conflict societies.[19] Conversely, academic research and policy debates on armed conflict and peacebuilding discuss a broad variety of topics relevant to post-conflict politics, but give almost no attention to the formation of political parties.[20]

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[18] Notable exceptions include Manning (2007), Sisk (1996), and Lyons (2005).

[19] 'Classic' studies by Duverger (1960), Sartori (1976) and even a new handbook on political parties by Katz and Crotty (2006) provide almost no information on post-war politics. In the field of party assistance, NDI and NIMD are among the few that have done some work in this area.

[20] Among the large number of studies on post-war peacebuilding and democratization, there are only a few that specifically address the role of political parties in the "demilitarization of politics" after war. See: Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (2002), Lyons (2005) and Reilly (2006).

My research tries to identify relevant party-related and post-conflict-related issues by drawing on both literatures (and policy practices) and by mapping the different types of parties and party systems in post-war societies. However, it focuses primarily on explaining how and why post-war political parties emerge, develop and institutionalize in the way they do rather than looking at how political parties influence peacebuilding and post-war democratization.

Different Post-War Contexts

Post-conflict countries are often analyzed as one category. In practice, however, the historical, political and socioeconomic background of post-conflict countries differs widely, not only in terms of conflict duration, the scale of violence, and the nature of conflict, but also with regard to the type of conflict ending, and the way in which peace has been restored.[21] These different backgrounds have important implications for political party development.

Where conflict is ended through a military victory and peace can be 'self-enforced' (Rwanda, Ethiopia), all state resources will accrue to the victorious party. This enables the latter to strengthen its organizational capacities and consolidate its dominance in the political party arena. In 'mediated cases' (Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia), financial resources and political power are usually much more fragmented and will have to be shared among the main political groups taking part in the peace negotiations. The significant involvement of international actors in these situations –in the form of assistance, political pressure, or even (imposed) transitional administration– can profoundly affect the organizational development of certain parties or skew the distribution of power. Finally, in conflictual cases where certain groups are intentionally excluded from the power-sharing agreement (Afghanistan), political development is skewed in favor of the included parties. In contrast to the first category, however, that development can be undermined by renewed violence from armed militias and other groups not represented in the peace settlement.

In addition, there are several general conditions that make political party development in post-war settings particularly challenging. First, the law and order situation remains problematic and with state institutions having little or no presence in many parts of the country, crime rates often soar in former war zones. This lack of security in remote and rural areas restricts movements of political parties and hinders their capacity to recruit and educate party members or mount election campaigns to attract popular support. Second, because of the scarcity of resources in post-conflict societies, most political parties find it difficult to establish local offices or take part in expensive electoral campaigns. Some political parties are co-opted by powerful economic interests. Under such conditions, corruption can be become rampant and public disillusionment over the performance of parties is often high. Third, the traditional bonds of family, kinship and community are adversely affected by prolonged war and bloodshed, and trust across different socioeconomic, political and ethnic groups is eroded. Political parties commonly align themselves with these separate societal groups, instead of representing groups across different social, cultural or ethnic cleavages. As a result, inter-party dialogue and cooperation becomes more difficult.[22]

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[21] A study by the Chr. Michelsen Institute for UNDP (2004, pp. 3-4) makes a useful –although not mutually exclusive– distinction between cases of self-enforced, mediated, and conflictual peacebuilding.

[22] Kumar and de Zeeuw (forthcoming).

Different Parties and Party Systems

Despite these adverse structural conditions, political parties have mushroomed in practically all post-conflict societies. It is important to emphasize that political parties in post-conflict societies cannot be easily compared with their counterparts in more established democracies. Many of them are elite-based, embryonic political organizations that draw their support mainly from urban areas and do not have strong roots in society. Moreover, similar to other parties in "new democracies" almost all of them revolve around charismatic leaders, have limited political experience, and mainly appeal to the specific loyalty of certain regional, ethnic or other groups. Nevertheless, there are different types of parties (and different ways to distinguish between them), each with its own organizational strengths and weaknesses.

First, there are traditional ruling parties such as the MPLA in Angola, the CPP in Cambodia, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the NRM/A in Uganda, which have relatively strong party organizations that can rely on significant grassroots support. Most of these parties maintain an extensive network of party offices throughout the country and have members in key political and administrative positions inside and outside the government. Their control over key state institutions and access to economic resources ensures their dominant role in post-war party systems.

A unique type of post-conflict party is one that emerges out of politico-military groups or armed rebel movements. RENAMO in Mozambique and the FMLN in El Salvador are examples of (relatively) successful rebel-to-party transformations. Other organizations like the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, the SPLM/A in Sudan and Hamas in Palestine have only partially transformed, adapting some of their strategies but not giving up their control over armed militias entirely. Then there are façade rebel-to-party transformations (LTTE and several Afghan militias), where organizations and their leaders are not really interested in becoming a political party and the political wing serves as a 'front' for continuing military activities. And finally there are failed transformations (RUF, Khmer Rouge), in which the former rebel group barely exists anymore and has not succeeded as a political organization. For all these examples of soldiers-turned-politicians, the key challenges include the demilitarization of organizational structures, the development of a party organization, the democratization of decision-making and the adaptation of goals and tactics.[23]

Post-conflict countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are also home to mono-ethnic and ethnic congress parties. Such parties mobilize people on the basis of ethnicity rather than a cross-cutting ideology, and their goals often centre on the narrow interests of an ethnic group(s) rather than broader-based societal interests. In some post-war countries, where conflict was triggered or influenced by identity issues related to religion, race, linguistic or tribal affiliations, ethnic parties still have a strong popular appeal. For example, when the Yugoslavian state disintegrated because of its failure to accommodate the aspirations of different ethnic groups, war and bloodshed did not undermine ethnic loyalties of political parties; instead it consolidated them. This has also been the case in settings like Kosovo, Ethiopia, and the DRC.

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[23] For a more systematic analysis of various cases of rebel-to-party transformation, see De Zeeuw (2008).

And finally, in post-conflict countries many new, small political parties emerge. Some of them, such as the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in Cambodia and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) in Uganda, are established by (diaspora) intellectuals or democrats disillusioned by the existing state of affairs. Others are founded by special interest groups, and focus on, for example, anti-corruption issues, women's rights, territorial unity and the environment. Many of these new post-conflict parties turn out to be "flash parties" that come and go whenever there are elections. Only some of them are able to survive by gradually building up popular (and economic) support.

All these parties interact and compete with one another in various ways. Reviewing the party systems of almost 30 post-conflict countries, my research indicates that the majority can be categorized as dominant authoritarian (40%), dominant non-authoritarian (24%) or pulverised (31%). The dynamics of interaction in these systems is very different. In the first category (including countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda), civil and political rights are restricted, opposition parties are weak and there is one party that holds an absolute majority of seats. In dominant non-authoritarian systems (East Timor, Burundi), the restrictions are eased and dominance by a particular party usually results from superior (electoral) organization. In pulverised systems (Afghanistan, DRC, Guatemala), there is a plethora of weak, often miniscule parties, most of which are unable to survive multiple elections or cannot make a decisive political impact.[24]

Explaining Variation in Institutionalization

The above shows that in post-war societies parties differ in their organization and political strength, and that party systems vary in their stability, the rootedness of parties in society, and the legitimacy of party competition and elections.[25] The different degrees of institutionalization of parties and party systems has traditionally been explained by the nature of electoral competition, the socioeconomic, ethnic and religious cleavages in society, and the type of electoral system and government.[26] Some of these factors indeed play a role in post-war societies.

However, preliminary analysis of post-war politics in El Salvador and Cambodia indicates that the war-time origins of political parties and the nature of the conflict ending and peace agreement are probably more important for understanding party development and the power configuration of party competition after war.[27] For example, the historical background of the FMLN and FUNCINPEC as armed guerrilla organizations has deeply influenced these parties' organizations, as well as their leadership styles, ideologies and political programs. Also the fact that in both countries the war ended in a military stalemate instead of a decisive victory for one of the main actors, created a situation in which neither ARENA nor the FMLN, and neither the CPP nor FUNCINPEC could fully dominate the negotiations and/or dictate the terms of the peace settlement. As a result, the party systems of El Salvador and Cambodia became more pluralistic, even though limited competitiveness (Cambodia) and extreme polarization (El Salvador) have since become problematic.

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[24] When in 2006 the DRC held its first democratic elections since 40 years, more than 9,000 parliamentary candidates and 250 political parties took part, most of them having registered for the first time.
[25] Randall and Svåsand (2002); Mainwaring and Scully (1995).
[26] Duverger (1959); Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Harris and Reilly (1998).
[27] This analysis consists of an extensive literature review and in-depth interviews in both countries as part of my doctoral research.

The Role of International Actors

International organizations have engaged in several ways with political parties in post-war societies, with the overall focus of their engagement usually being the development of a democratic multi-party system. First, international actors have provided technical assistance for designing constitutional and legal provisions for the registration and organization of political parties, their rights and responsibilities in elections, and the financing of their activities. Second, financial, logistic and training assistance is provided to strengthen the organizational capacities of parties, to help them conduct more professional election campaigns, to stimulate multi-party dialogue, and to improve parties' performance in legislatures. And finally, international actors have supported the transformation of former rebel movements into political parties through a combination of political pressure and support, and technical, logistic and financial assistance.

The exact impact of all these international programs on post-conflict party development and the adoption of less divisive forms of inter-party competition remains unclear. A recent study on this topic concludes that political party assistance has generally had a modestly positive effect on parties' campaign techniques, organizational development and acceptance of their role in a democratic political system, but at the same time has not had any major "transformative impact".[28] Other studies that do not focus on party assistance per se, but look at other aspects of international engagement with post-war political party development, such as party regulation and electoral system design in Bosnia and Kosovo, come to broadly similar conclusions.[29] Moreover, local politicians often suspect international programs to be partisan and benefiting particular parties rather than the overall party system. Despite well-intended efforts to allay some of this mistrust, international engagement with political parties remains a controversial activity.

Policy Implications

My research holds a number of implications for future international engagement with post-conflict party development:

First, because there is hardly any systematic information available, there is a need to invest more time and policy-relevant analysis on this topic. Major questions for such analysis should include: how do parties institutionalize in post-conflict situations; how can party systems be made more competitive without jeopardizing peace and stability; and how can domestic and international actors most effectively support the institutionalization of representative and accountable party organizations?

Second, research findings underscore the caution expressed by other studies that institutional engineering for party system reform –by way of tinkering with the electoral system, regulating party behavior and finance, and designing power-sharing arrangements– do not always have the intended effect and often fail to influence the actual behavior of political party leaders.

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[28] Carothers (2006), p.163, and pp.184-189. The lack of transformative impact can partly be attributed to the limited amounts of money spent on international party aid –particularly in comparison with the more costly state-building and peacekeeping programs in post-war societies.
[29] Reilly (2006), p.823; Manning (2004).

Moreover, regulating political party behavior is not just a technical, but predominantly a political challenge. Any changes made to the way political parties compete with each other affect the balance of power in a party system, and are therefore likely to be resisted by the prospective "losers." Domestic and international policy makers should therefore pre-empt such resistance by designing appropriate strategies and concrete initiatives to defuse the most hazardous political tensions early on.

Fourth, international engagement with post-war party development is important not only from a democratization perspective, but particularly from a peacebuilding perspective. Ignoring partial or façade transformations of (former) rebel groups-turned-political parties, turning a blind eye to dominant-authoritarian party systems, or not engaging parties with the right strategies and programs, may lead to (new) political grievances and ultimately risks a relapse into violent conflict.

Finally, because of its politically sensitive nature and the suspicion over its intentions, the use of international party support requires great care. This is particularly the case in insecure post-conflict settings, where the political stakes for parties and party leaders are higher than elsewhere. Close liaison and an open dialogue with all parties, domestic policy makers, civil society leaders, the media and other relevant organizations about the objectives of such programs are critical to prevent any backlashes against international engagement.

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Exercising Foreign Authority in Contexts of Linguistic & Cultural Difference

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This memo provides a few reflections about the ways in which foreign authority was claimed and exercised in the context of post-war state-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina during field research carried out between 2000 and 2004. Contrary to much work on international intervention, my research takes seriously the often unproblematized fact of linguistic and cultural difference that characterizes all such contexts. It is important to recall just what the thousands of foreigners working in Bosnia's many NGOs and inter-governmental agencies were expected to do - namely, navigate a social and cultural field most knew nothing about. Moreover, they were expected to work not only within the context of a language they did not know (at times rendered in an alphabet most could not read), but also within the context of a language, English, that for most was not their mother tongue. At the same time, their very presence in the country was predicated on the assumption that they were there to transform it. I discovered, perhaps not surprisingly, that there existed a strong connection between the ways in which foreign authority is claimed and exercised and the knowledge practices through which foreign actors and agencies made sense of Bosnian politics and society - and their role in re-shaping it.

More specifically, I found that the exercise of authority on the part of foreign actors relied upon and actively reproduced a binary distinction between foreigner or "international" and domestic or "local." This dichotomy organized people, practices and perspectives into a hierarchy that valorized and privileged the "international" procedures and positions (and those who embodied them), while at the same time critiquing "local" practices (and those who embodied them). I also found that, when routinized, this basic way of exercising authority led to a problem lamented by many in the "international community," namely, that the goals of intervention came to be seen primarily as the project of outsiders, with little involvement or commitment to achieving them on the part of domestic populations. In what follows, I outline some of the basic conceptualizations that underwrite this dichotomy in favor of the "international." I then offer a brief example of how one way that foreigner intervention agencies and actors managed the problem of language difference valorized and authorized "international" perspectives and projects over those of the Bosnian population. I follow this with a consideration of some of the stakes involved for foreign intervention agencies by pointing to a few negative effects of organizing the exercise of authority through this dichotomy. Finally, I conclude with a few reflections on what it would take to mitigate some of these negative effects.

Powerful Metaphors and Fictions of Neutrality

It is important to begin by noting that foreign actors and agencies in Bosnia benefited from a widely shared understanding of power that conceptualizes politics and society in terms of scalar metaphors. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) have described how state power relies upon and reproduces metaphors of *verticality* (the state lies "above" federal

units, provinces, entities, cantons, municipalities, etc.) as well as *encompassment* (with state agencies located within a series of ever-widening circles that begin with the family and local community and ends with the global system of nation states). This imagined topography of stacked, vertical levels also structures many images of political and social action, which are imagined as coming "from below," as "grounded" in rooted lives and communities. The state can thus be imagined as reaching "down" into communities, intervening in a "top down" manner, to manipulate or plan social transformation (2002: 982-984).

However, these metaphors of scale are not merely spatial, but are also hierarchical, in that the "higher" one sits on the scale, the greater the claim to universal value and significance, and to generality of knowledge and interest. Thus just as "the state" is conceived of as "higher" (ethically as well as politically) than the civil society it sits above and encompasses, I found that in Bosnia, those agencies that claim to be part of the "international community" implicitly relied upon the notion that they embodied greater superiority and universality—more *universally valid* forms, norms and practices—than other actors, whether of individual states or any other "level" of institutional power that lies "lower" on the vertical scale and is encompassed by the "international."

Such images of vertical encompassment are powerful, however, only because they are embedded in and extended through the routinized practices of state bureaucracies, supranational or transnational inter-governmental agencies and NGOs, as well as the strategies of activists and others trying to promote social and political transformation. They are influential because they are fundamental to how scholars, journalists, officials and citizens imagine and inhabit the world of nation-states. In Bosnia, as elsewhere in much of the world, ordinary citizens, social activists, domestic political elites and foreign actors all conceived of power (and at times exercised it) in these metaphorical terms.

When applied to the "international community," this scalar imagery also underwrote the notion of foreign neutrality as well as "international intervention" in Bosnia, in that those occupying the "international" position could claim to be somehow outside of, "above" or external to the social and cultural field into which they were then "intervening." Indeed, while foreign actors were not at all external to or disinterested in the politics of a place like Bosnia, their authority to intervene and mediate in a context defined by antagonistic ethnic difference came in part from claiming to be so. I found that this self-conceptualization was always situated within a binary distinction differentiating the foreigner or "international" from the domestic or "local": the "international" was defined as external, cosmopolitan, apolitical, neutral, and non-positioned, while the "local" was rooted in place, mono-ethnic or national, political, biased, and always positioned.

In what follows, I provide an account of the ways in which this dichotomy played into the basic practices and ideals of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). I show how ideologies of transparency (1) shaped the self-image and authorized the mandate of the OSCE, (2) lay at the heart of breakdowns of communication that were a regular feature of interactions between OSCE officials and the vulnerable Bosnian populations they aimed to serve, and (3) reproduced the dichotomy valorizing the "international" perspective over those of ordinary Bosnians when it came to understanding the problems and solutions facing post-war Bosnian politics and society.

Different Cultures of Information Circulation

My research made clear that in Bosnia there were different cultures of knowledge control and circulation: one we might call post-socialist, and the other "textualist." Beginning with the latter, in what may at first appear an extremely banal example, I found that one key way in which foreign authority in Bosnia was made and exercised was through the creation of texts (which were, of course, in the English language). Not only was this the basic way through which foreigners came to understand Bosnian politics and society; it was one of the primary ways in which the OSCE realized the agentive capacities open to them (such as "monitoring" human rights abuses and the rule of law). The transformative work of the OSCE clearly required an ability to understand the complex terrain of post-war Bosnia, particularly in fulfilling their mandate to "prevent and address human rights violations, build local capacity and transfer knowledge and expertise to BiH authorities and citizens in human rights and the rule of law," as well as to assist "the authorities of BiH to develop democratic structures that are…open and responsive to the needs of citizens." And yet, it would not be an overstatement to say that the everyday interactions between the foreign staff of the OSCE and ordinary Bosnians were attended by profound uncertainty and anxiety regarding the reliability and trustworthiness of the information they possessed, how it was interpreted, and where it circulated. The predominant way that organizations like the OSCE managed that uncertainty was through the creation and circulation of texts (from on-the-ground assessments of elections and inter-office reports on democratization training to political and legal analyses and property repossession statistics). To understand why this was the case, we need to look at the ideology that informed the text-based practices that then mediated the relationship between foreign actors and Bosnians, and how a notion of transparency played a critical legitimizing role.

Scholars of language and literacy[1] have described how the pervasive belief that written texts are context-independent is underwritten by an ideology in which written texts are regarded as "linguistically transparent," with fixed, primarily denotational meanings, making them equally available to all, thus eliding any overt concern with the conditions of their production. I found that this led to two important effects in contexts of cultural and linguistic difference like international intervention. The first is that this "textualist" ideology results in the elimination of the dynamic and contingent social relations from which such texts are made, and thus acts to elide the transformative work of translation. This, in turn, led to the second effect, namely, that this elision gives written texts an impersonal and abstract quality taken by foreign actors to index the modernity, rationality, and universality of text-based information. (The self-identification of foreign actors with these virtues associated with text forms versus non-text forms mapped onto the binary distinction mentioned above, that between foreigners (or "internationals") and Bosnians (or "locals") – more on this below).

The routine generation and circulation of texts through institutional circuits in Bosnia where the "international" language of English was the medium of communication served not only to authorize these forms, but it also excluded the majority of Bosnians who might raise questions about the commensurability of English-language text representations and Bosnian social life. This exclusion acted to implicitly reassure OSCE officials that the texts through which they apprehended Bosnian society and politics stood as adequate representations of the contexts of their intervention.

Moreover, the association of English-language texts with the legitimacy of things "international" (replying upon the conceptual imagery of vertical encompassment

described above) also made them ideal for the transformative work of the OSCE through the form of surveillance open to them (as part of their mandate to "monitor" human rights violations and the rule of law). The kinds of texts involved in OSCE monitoring—human rights codes, municipal government procedures, freedom of information acts, or fair-hiring practices—were never elaborated by Bosnians, but by "international" bodies like the OSCE. Already legitimized as representatives of the "international" from which the authority of these texts derives, foreigners at the OSCE exercised their authority by identifying any gaps between their interpretation of English-language texts and the practices of Bosnian institutions, and then policing those gaps.

In sum, the production of English-language texts, underwritten by an ideology of transparent meaning, did enormous work to manage the uncertainty that attended navigating a foreign context. They also made possible the particular mode of surveillance practiced by the OSCE. Important for the discussion here, however, is the fact that such institutionalized practices reproduced a text/non-text distinction that equated "impersonal" text forms—and those who use them—with modernity, rationality, and universality, and that problematized non-text forms as less reliable because produced by personal, particular, unmodern, even "paranoid" forms of communication.

It will come as no surprise to anyone working in the post-socialist world, however, that conditions of everyday life under Yugoslav socialism—particularly the hardships of the 1980s—bred a well-developed wariness regarding the capricious exercise of bureaucratic or state power, and necessitated the cultivation of informal networks and the constant use of friends and connections to make life survivable. Such survival strategies justified strong distinctions between the private and public, or the "us" of family and friends, and the "them" of state officials and other political elites. This witnessed a general uncertainty about the intentions of others, about whom to trust with information and whose information to trust.

Thus often the most effective way to pursue any goals was to do so informally, either through personal connections or developing kin-like relations of obligation that were recognizably "private" and thus fell within the ethical rules of behavior associated with "us." For most Bosnians, then, personal, verbal, face-to-face interactions carried much more weight and offered much more protection than any textual, translated, or other similarly mediated interactions. In Bosnia, most people saw their agency to lie in preventing unwanted surveillance from accessing "the private," thus controlling information about themselves and how it could be interpreted.

This became a problem when, in one telling example, Bosnian returning refugees would go to OSCE officials to complain about human rights abuses such as ethnic discrimination on the part of municipal government, but were often reluctant or even refused to accept the solutions offered by the OSCE Human Rights Officers (HROs) who were ostensibly there to help them. Returnees or their representatives would come to the HRO with various complaints of abuse and discrimination, but displayed an extreme reluctance to submit the kinds of information the HRO required in the written form he required in order to "monitor" the case (the name of the client and their other personal information, and then the specific information of the case, including the names of the officials who may have been involved and the specific accusations at hand). This was particularly the case once it became clear how the HRO planned to proceed, namely, by inquiring in the relevant municipal institutions as a kind of advocate of the "client."

When such information was not forthcoming, HROs would state over and again that they needed "concrete cases"—facts, not rumors or stories—and routinely admonished returnee representatives that they had few facts or little information that they could use to deal with the Municipality. Their unwillingness or inability to submit "concrete cases" in the written (translated) form required often led HROs to openly wonder whether their interlocutors were being honest with them, or whether they were pursuing some other personal agenda they would not reveal.

In a conversation with one HRO in northwestern Bosnia about why virtually no one who came to seek help for human rights abuses would ever return, he described the disappointment he saw in their faces when he offered them a solution that did not match their expectations and hopes. I noted how it reflected a common interpretation made by foreign officials regarding the problems facing Bosnia. In earlier conversations, this HRO told me that the Ottoman and communist periods left Bosnia rampant with clientelism and a fetish of "personal connections," in addition to a penchant for conspiracy theories. He referred to this when telling me about his visits with potential clients (*always* mediated by a translator):

> when after listening to their problems I did not respond simply by saying 'I will solve your problem,' their face would fall. They would think, 'The cow I brought you wasn't good enough, my smile was not nice enough, my story not sad enough for you to like me or take a personal interest in me…because if you took a personal interest in me to do something, you could, because you are OSCE.' And they would not return, thinking they had failed to invoke personal interest for the kind of solution they thought I could do.

Given the description above, it should be clear that anything *not* easily placed into English-language text form was problematic for foreigners. First, it complicated the ability of OSCE actors to realize the agentive capacities open to them - they could not carry out their "monitoring" mission without such "entextualized" information. Second, it introduced the very uncertainty that texts were supposed to manage: if entextualized information is transparent, abstract, rational and universal in its meaning, then unentextualized information points to the socially-intersubjective nature of meaning, the ambiguity and ambivalence raised by practices of translation, and the fact of cultural difference, all of which foreigners were poorly equipped to mediate.

It is here that the notion of transparency achieved through texts got invested with a virtuous quality, an ethics of sincerity and honesty that was borrowed from the ideology relating transparency to "good governance" and accountability and trust. The effect was a subtle equation of foreigners' inability to adequately understand Bosnia outside of English-language texts with notions of corruption, self-interest, and other abuses of power that flourish where such transparency is lacking. In this way, the willingness of Bosnians to submit their claims to foreign text-making practices became a metric for the OSCE to judge the trustworthiness and truthfulness of those claims – as well as the modernity and rationality of those making them. Hence, in the interactions described earlier, the demand by HROs for "concrete" cases—not "rumors or stories"—was in part a test whether the complaints of returnees were the product of gossip or paranoid social thought (thus not worth taking seriously), or were cynical attempts to exploit the power of the OSCE for personal ends (and thus not worth taking seriously). The willingness and ability of Bosnians to give the HROs information in the form they required also indexed for them the kinds of people they were – recall the remark about how they were trying to

cultivate "personal interest," a sign of clientelism. Or the remark about the cow - a clear marking of the peasant, unmodern nature of his Bosnian interlocutors.

However, it is important to resist this interpretation and note that the reason for the reluctance or unwillingness of Bosnians to submit to foreign entextualization came from the fact that they were operating under a different moral economy of knowledge control and circulation. This, in part, explains why local/foreign interactions were so fraught. The foreign staff of the OSCE clearly fell into the public/"them" slot, and were thus seen as powerful persons to be appealed to or potential connections to be cultivated, but not necessarily people to be trusted. Other factors worked against establishing the requirements for trust – the rapid rotation of foreign personnel meant that there was little time to establish a relationship, and the need for translation and the presence of an interpreter increased social distance and meant that communication could never be truly direct, interpersonal, or face-to-face. Most foreigners were shut out of Bosnian social networks because culturally-specific conditions necessary to establish trust were rarely established (or establishable). Moreover, these conditions for establishing trust were likely to be interpreted negatively by foreigners and re-buffed as evidence of the hidden practices of "personal connections" that they were there to transform. On the other hand, few Bosnians felt comfortable with the kind of exposure that inhered in the "concrete cases" that the OSCE demanded in order to "monitor" their complaints. This was particularly the case if there was the possibility that their claims of abuse and recourse to the OSCE would become known to the municipal authorities who were likely to be around long after the OSCE had left.

Thus, ideologies of transparency invested an epistemological problem for foreigners—how to understand Bosnian politics and society—with an ethics of honesty and trust, endowing their English text-based practices of thinking and acting with a virtuous quality. This became embedded in a larger process of "othering," in drawing binary distinctions between Bosnians and "internationals" in ways that reinforced foreigners' superior self-image and restated the need for and terms of their intervention. But the "othering" went both ways, with foreigners frustrated in their mission by being shut out of Bosnian social networks of trust and information circulation.

Stakes

Drawing upon the example of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, the stakes for the agents of international intervention are multiple and far-reaching. At the very least, by exercising authority through and thus actively reproducing the kinds of binary distinctions described above, the goals of intervention—from the myriad projects that fall under the heading of "nation-building" to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian or developmental aid—can come to be seen primarily as the project of foreigners, with little real ramification for domestic populations. Not only can this result in a situation where there is very little commitment by or attachment to the goals or methods of intervention by the general population, such as the inability of the OSCE to convincingly fulfill its mission to "monitor" human rights violations described above. Moreover, often the controversial nature of intervention goals (such as institutional or economic reform) may result in, at best, a lukewarm commitment by domestic authorities. It can also tempt them to use the fact of foreign intervention to resist any responsibility for the robust implementation of what may be unpopular goals. (In Bosnia, this was generally referred to as the problem of "ownership.") Moreover, there are often political actors who will exploit the foreign/domestic dichotomy and argue against the transformations that are often the

goal of foreign intervention by claiming that they are in fact "alien" or "foreign to" the culture or peoples that are the object of intervention. (Of course, a parallel practice occurs just as often, in which local political elites mobilize or refer to "European" or "international" practices and norms to associate their aims with the legitimacy that come from things with a more "universal" value.)

Bracketing the question of whether intervention or its goals are appropriate or just, often without realizing it or being able to avoid it, the agents of foreign intervention risk seeing their efforts and resources spent in ways that have little more than temporary or limited success. Or even worse, the foreign presence and resources may be used in ways that have the opposite of their intended effect. In the case of Bosnia, the combination of the passivity, indifference, or hostility of the local population, the difficulty in finding local "partners" to work with (or at least any that had social legitimacy), as well as the "politics" of local elites were all used as evidence to (re)justify the need for foreign intervention and (1) the imposition of laws and institutional reforms (designed and elaborated by foreign actors), (2) the removal of elected officials from office, as well as (3) other actions designed to spur the social, political, and economic transformations that seemed so frustratingly stalled. In an ironic circular fashion, these actions often ended up exacerbating the conditions that led to the passivity and lack of commitment in the first place, thus becoming evidence for arguments about the need for farther-reaching powers of intervention. The fact that many of these acts appeared to directly contradict the spirit of democracy and human rights that most foreign intervention agencies claim underscores their purpose (as well as their legitimacy) is an another oft-noted irony and exposes such agencies to charges of hypocrisy, imperialism and conspiracy theorizing, all of which further hamper any intervention projects.

What is to be done?

Having noted these problems, I find it difficult to suggest actions that might ameliorate these effects, in part because such suggestions might undermine the binary distinction legitimizing the intervention of foreign agencies in the first place (and that may, in fact, partly account for what makes them effective). With this in mind, I offer two ideas to aid our discussion.

(1) The first is simply a *systemic* recognition of the effects of managing linguistic and cultural difference in the ways outlined here. I found in the field that there was recognition of these conditions by the foreign staff with the most day-to-day interactions with the local population, but that they were severely restricted (if not actively discouraged) in what they could do about it because dealing with the fact of linguistic and cultural difference was not why they were hired, not considered a priority by their superiors, and thus not rewarded behavior. This is why any suggested changes need to be preceded by a systemic recognition about the risks associated with exercising authority through the dichotomies described above.

(2) One clear way in which this situation could be changed is to define cultural and particularly linguistic skills as a core part of what makes intervention not only successful, but also legitimate. This would mean making language training a *required* part of any international intervention, particularly for anyone deployed to a foreign country for longer than three months. The language training should last as long as the deployment lasts, and failure to progress in proficiency should be a real part of assessing whether an individual should be promoted, kept in their present position, or dismissed. In Bosnia,

this would go a long way towards mitigating the uncertainty and anxiety about information that attends making sense of and acting in a foreign context. It would also help more fully engage various populations in the sites of intervention by recognizing and more effectively meeting culturally-specific conditions of trust, and this, in turn, would do more to aid the goals of any intervention than thousands of statements about the desire to be "equal partners" with those populations.

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Weighing the Benefits and Drawbacks of Participatory Constitution Making

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Participatory constitution making is likely to be consequential for political culture but the effect is not inevitably positive. Data from surveys and in-depth interviews in Uganda indicate that involving the public in the making of a new constitution can have important benefits: it may make citizens more democratic, knowledgeable, discerning, engaged, and attached to the constitution. However, participation has the potential to increase public acceptance of the new constitutional rules only when opposition elites feel included and supportive (or are too weak to influence citizens). Where the process and outcome leave elites feeling polarized and antagonistic, participatory constitution making can exacerbate rather than heal mass divisions and reduce rather than enhance constitutional support.

This memo suggests a number of steps that can be taken to maximize the positive effects of participation on the development of democratic culture. It also suggests policies to minimize polarization of public views of the constitution. Ultimately, however, these policies cannot completely eliminate the danger that public involvement in the constitution-making process provides a conduit for elite divisions to penetrate the mass public. Instead of recommending extensive participation in every constitution-making exercise, reformers need to be more discerning about the existing context in which participation will take place. Mass participation should not be adopted in the absence of elite inclusion and consensus.

Enhancing Democratic Culture

In the current wave of democratization, several countries embarked on innovative constitution-making programs designed to develop democratic norms as well as to create formal institutions. The Ugandan process provided for extensive involvement by the general public over an eight-year period. Ugandans attended local government and associational meetings on the constitutions, they contributed their views in oral and written form to a constitutional commission, they campaigned and voted for constituent assembly delegates, and they lobbied those delegates for favored provisions. Eritrea, South Africa and Albania are just some of the countries that followed with analogous participatory processes. Of late, reformers are advocates for the participatory model of constitutional development in countries as diverse as Iraq and Nigeria.

Drawing on survey, interview, and archival data, I identify the individual level consequences of citizen involvement in the Ugandan constitution-making process. The quantitative and qualitative data indicate that participation was associated with greater democratic attitudes, higher political and constitutional knowledge, and more critical capacity. The participatory process provided citizens with new tools with which to

evaluate the subsequent democratic performance of their government institutions. Analysis of the process suggests three key policy approaches that can heighten the positive effects of participatory constitution-making on democratic culture.

First, much of the participation in the Ugandan process was organized by appointed officials and civic groups rather than by politicians seeking votes. These officials had an interest in mobilizing a broad section of the population to become involved, whereas politicians typically aim to mobilize only those supporters who are likely to vote for them. Extensive mobilization of public participation in any process will require major efforts, resources, and forethought but will also depend on who organizes citizen actions. Attention should be paid to ensuring that leaders have an interest in mobilizing politically disadvantaged populations so that the program counteracts rather than reinforces existing political inequalities.

Second, the architects of the Ugandan constitution-making process designed their participatory activities with the goals of educating the public and building democratic attitudes. Programs are more likely to alter political culture when those goals are explicit and programs are designed accordingly.

Third, the Ugandan process failed to increase feelings of political efficacy due to lack of sufficient follow-up. It is crucial to continue constitutional education and dissemination of constitutional materials following the promulgation of the constitution. Citizens are likely to conclude that their involvement is efficacious only if they receive detailed feedback about the results of their efforts.

Minimizing Polarization of the Mass Public

Even supporters of the participatory constitution-making model acknowledge some drawbacks. Programs that provide for the extensive involvement of the public take longer to complete. Organizing participatory programs takes time, delays the establishment of the new rules, and prolongs the transition phase. Participatory processes are also costly in terms of material resources and human expertise. These resources must be diverted from other important programs or solicited from outside sources. Finally, to the extent that the constitution includes public input, the resulting documents are likely to be longer, more cumbersome, and more inconsistent than those developed without mass input.

My research reveals another possible negative outcome of participatory constitution-making: the polarization of public attitudes toward the constitution. It would be a mistake to assume that any constitution-making process (participatory or otherwise) would be free from the influences of societal cleavages and political differences. However, when the outcome of the process depends on political participation, leaders have a greater interest in mobilizing the public to share their views on the constitution and to support certain provisions. Political wrangles and accusations that might otherwise remain at the elite level are more likely to be passed on to the general public. Furthermore, leaders will find it more difficult to make concessions and build a consensus when negotiations occur under the watch of a mobilized and passionate public. As a result, public participation in constitution making has the potential to make the resolution of societal and political conflicts more difficult by expanding the number of interests that must be considered and by intensifying citizens' preferences. Any program that involves significant public

participation runs the risk that the public will become polarized in how it views the constitution. The magnitude of the risk depends in part on the size, strength, and perspective of the political opposition.

Ugandan opposition leaders felt deeply alienated by the process and the outcome, which they felt excluded them from political power. In my survey, a small percentage of citizens expressed intensely negative sentiments about the constitution-making process and the constitution. Their small numbers and locations reflect the opposition's strength (or lack thereof) at the time of the constitution-making process. My research indicates that participation had no direct effect on constitutional legitimacy. In Uganda, as elsewhere, ordinary people have difficulty evaluating the constitution-making process and the constitution itself. Ugandan citizens looked to political elites for cues. Elites also made concerted efforts to influence public opinion on constitutional issues. Both active and inactive citizens seem to have been highly influenced by elite rhetoric. Local leaders (rather than participation) influenced whether citizens came to view the constitution as legitimate or illegitimate.

My research in Uganda suggests a number of steps that can be taken to minimize the politicization of the process and the corresponding polarization of public views of the constitution. First, leaders should strive to reach some degree of consensus on the constitution-making process and on the final constitutional arrangement before involving the public.[30] Such preparation will prevent a group of elites from rejecting outright the process and the constitution and from convincing the public to do likewise. Achieving some consensus initially also allows leaders to make necessary concessions before going public with their platforms. Furthermore, a fundamental commitment to the process must be maintained throughout the time needed to create the constitution.

Second, attempts should be made to insulate the constitution-making process and the constitution makers from the ongoing political process and political leaders. The government in power should appoint constitution makers and monitors only after consulting with the opposition. In addition, constitution makers should be prevented from holding political positions at the same time or in the immediate aftermath of the constitution-making process. Finally, government leaders should face sanctions for interfering in the process.

Third, the time allowed for public input should be well defined and limited. In Uganda, the period allotted for constitution-making was extended several times. After nearly a decade of mobilizing to secure constitutional issues, organizations found it very difficult to reorient their programs to deal with nonconstitutional issues after promulgation. Furthermore, leaders who began with magnanimous goals became more concerned with maintaining power as time wore on. Finally, citizens found it hard to distinguish the constitutional issues about which they had for so long been hearing from broader political issues. Participation takes time to organize, but a year or two of formal public input should be sufficient.

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[30] For example, the formal multiparty negotiations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa established the formula for the constitution-making process and for the basic constitutional principles that had to be respected.

Finally, constitutional education and dissemination of constitutional materials after the promulgation will dampen local elites' influence on citizen attitudes. My research shows that having been denied access to neutral information on the constitution, citizens depended on elites' political agendas for information. Continuing civic education will not only raise knowledge and efficacy (as suggested previously) but also counteract the polarization of citizen opinions of the constitution.

In sum, my research warns policymakers against completely abandoning the traditional approach to constitution making, with its emphasis on elite negotiations and inclusive institutions. Mass citizen participation during the constitution-writing process cannot substitute for agreement among leaders about the institutional outcomes. It is not possible to bypass opposing elites and build constitutional support from the ground up. However, an effort that is mindful of both elite and citizen inclusion can have significant positive benefits for democratic culture.

How I Learned to Write a "Note Verbale"

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My brief for this workshop is to share my views about how academics need to learn to speak to policy makers. I am here to talk about my experience about the difficulties I once faced (and still do) as a (quasi-)academic moving to the policy world, and what lessons I have learned on how to "translate" academic knowledge to policy practitioners and, since translation is a reciprocal transaction, how to respond to the exigencies of work in the policy world in a non-academic language.

Verily, verily, as a dear friend of mine who used to be in this very situation would say, I can't pretend to give any advice or insights, let alone offer guidance or a treatise on the skills you as young academics can use in your aspiration to make a difference in the policy world. All I can do is reflect, in retrospect, on some of the lessons I learned, often the hard way, when I joined the policy world and began interacting with colleagues and supervisors who, in the academic world, could have as well been my students.

The views I will now express are personal and subjective. Look at them as anecdotes informed by my experience as a 'practitioner' working for the Organization of African Unity, which became the African Union in 2002, on issues in an African context. The "note verbale," that glorious piece of diplomatic communication which I have chosen as the title for this presentation, is emblematic of the challenges I first faced when I joined the policy world. It is a very simple piece to write: no high school degree needed for it. But my new supervisors dealt so roughly with my first note verbale that I learned very quickly, and with shock, the uselessness of the *Chicago Manual of Style*! I must admit that I have since stopped reading it. I learned many other lessons along the way, on notes verbale and such, and I even became quite adept at drafting very good ones. But that first draft, I still remember it.

What else have I learned that I can share with you?

You shall take no credit for your work

Academia is about production, acquisition and dissemination of knowledge according to agreed protocols (methodology, verification, universal applicability, etc) in recognized or accredited settings. The policy world is about experience preferably acquired in the "real world" regardless of how it was acquired.

Academic titles are supposed to convey appreciation for the degree of intellectual maturity one has achieved. Research pieces are always full of (self-) references, and a bibliography testifies to the author's scholarship. There is little or no equivalent in the real world. Quite the contrary, there may be a certain resistance to "intellectuals," often

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[31] The author takes sole and full responsibility for the views expressed in this piece.

accompanied by derisive comments on (in my case) "consultants": "They hold higher degrees but have no clue of what our work is all about!"

Lesson learned: You shall not flash those little two or three words and a dot that precede or follow your names (until you are fully integrated; by this time it shall be too late to do so, anyway). Since yours will always be "drafts" that you will submit to your supervisor for approval, you should resign yourself to claiming no credit for your work.

Think outside the box, act inside it

Creativity and imagination ("innovation") are a key to professional success and personal fame in academia. One can write about the 'State and the Crisis in Africa', or the 'Crisis of the State in Africa,' or even the 'African State in Crisis.' One can go a step further with a title like the 'Vampire State in Africa.'

Some friends in the think-tank world (this is the subject for another workshop) are fond of contrasting "hegemons," like South Africa and Nigeria, to "Lilliputian states," like Swaziland and Lesotho. Experts have written extensively about the balance of power in international relations. Even among African governments, there is a (rather tacit) recognition that some countries are more important than others in the defense of the interests of the continent. But in the world ruled by the sacrosanct principle of sovereign equality, there are no hegemons or Lilliputians.

The fifty-three member states of the African Union do not seem to feel uncomfortable with the fact that only five of them should shoulder three-quarters of the organization's annual budget. But these 'free-loaders,' as it were, have fiercely opposed any attempt by the "big five" to control a representation in the structure of the organization proportional to their assessed contribution.

During the debate on the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2001-2002, the Lilliputians of African politics soundly defeated every attempt by the hegemons to create a category of permanent (i.e. the hegemons) and non-permanent members of the fifteen-member quasi-Security Council for Africa. In the end, the organization settled for a rotating system of five members sitting for three years, and ten for two years. And in the African representation in the UN Security Council, one will easily find Lilliputians seating alongside hegemons, as is the case at the moment.

Relevance, not elegance

This is by far the major pitfall academics talking to policy makers should avoid. It is about "redacting" excellent analytical pieces but trivial or impractical policy recommendations. Academic sophistication in explaining the world is not readily digestible by a policy world hungry to transform it. Policy-makers expect 'actionable recommendations.' Most of what academics write about doesn't generally meet that need.

Structural adjustment or investments in farming and agricultural production may be an elegant and "tested" framework for economic recovery in a post-conflict society. But the reality is, people who lived through a civil war are very unlikely to abandon the practices that helped them survive economically for an elegant policy framework that is unrelated to their daily struggles. The poppy seeds rural economy in Afghanistan is an example.

Some years back, a debate raged in some think-tank and academic circles about what was known as "economic agendas in civil wars." The initiator of the project, a respected economist, academic and policy wonk, was (rightly or wrongly) accused of obsession with theoretical elegance in his effort to unveil, with econometric modeling, economic grievances at the roots of civil wars.

It's all about member states!

Consultation is a word one often hears, and consultation is what one is expected to undertake at all times. No policy recommendation can fly if it is not acceptable to member states as a whole, the Hegemons and the Lilliputians alike.

The African Union Constitutive Act condemns unconstitutional changes of governments. The coup d'état tops the list of such acts. But member states refused to include in the same category attempts by incumbents to change the constitution in order to extend their tenure in office. Also, they fiercely resisted the inclusion of electoral fraud as usurpation of power, a form of coup d'état and therefore an unconstitutional change of government.

Government reactions to putschists are also informative. During the constitutional crisis in the Comoros, nearly the entire membership of the Organization of African Unity refused to recognize the government of Colonel Azali and pushed ahead with sanctions. But in Madagascar in 2001, when Marc Ravalomanana seized power from President Ratsiraka, whom he accused of election rigging, the OAU was split in the middle. Ironically, the same governments which strongly opposed Colonel Azali's coup in the Comoros took sides for Marc Ravalomanana - the one who unseated an incumbent - and recognized him as duly elected head of state.

Obviously, governments have their own interests – agendas. So do bureaucrats, you might add. Yes, but who doesn't? Who would you prefer to deal with: those whose agenda is clear and known, or the ones who claim to be objective in a policy environment where everyone knows or suspects everyone else of harboring ulterior motives?

Constructive Ambiguity

You may be asked to draft statements that intend to convey the impression that something is being done about a certain situation when it is actually the opposite. In ordinary language, "we are monitoring the situation" simply means we are doing nothing about it. "Extensive discussions" could mean that we spent more time on procedural matters than on substance. And "comprehensive solutions" may not be as they sound.

Constructive ambiguities are generally used in an attempt to accommodate competing positions. In trying to satisfy everyone, nobody truly is, and whatever decision is reached cannot be implemented.

"Protocols" are intended to be operational, but some are notorious for their absolutely confusing meaning outside the small circle of those who drafted them. Take the Protocol on Abyei, the oil rich area in Sudan. The country is now debating the delineation of the line separating the north from the south. Abyei is hotly disputed by both the north and

the south. But the Protocol for Abyei cleverly considers it "a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan." But where is Abyei: in the north or the south?

Forget the *Chicago Manual of Style*…

…and the esoteric jargon of your discipline. C.Wright Mills (I believe) once wrote a damning piece on sociospeak. Do heed his counsel, and more. You decide the audience you write for and the purpose of your publication, and this decision influences the level of analysis and the terminology used. Often, this is an audience of your academic peers.

Writing for a policy audience is quite a different task. Preference should be given to short pieces, of one or one page and a quarter. Even for reports, the length is usually set in advance ("not more than 8000 words"), and the words are not always of your choosing. In the OAU, colleagues were fond of 'deploy efforts' or 'it being understood.' In the UN, there may be no paragraph (and a lengthy one) without 'including.'

As for the style: the audience may not have the same level of conceptual sophistication. Make every effort, therefore, to shun the jargon of your discipline and write (or speak) in a language that is understandable. It will help immensely if one uses the language of the audience. Doing this would guarantee your consultancy for ever.

Pay attention to the meaning of your words. Advocating "structural conflict prevention" sounds great and trendy, but member states rarely admit to having domestic troubles and when they do, they are often allergic to "external intervention."

By way of conclusion

Academia and the policy world serve different yet complementary purposes. Each performs useful functions in society. Each is subject to a set of rules and procedures that legitimize its purpose in society. The goal should not be to conflate them or make one subservient to the other. The ideal - and the challenge - is how to help the two worlds communicate and enrich each other. This is a challenge for both academics and policy makers.

I specifically talk about my experience in the OAU/AU. A dear friend of mine, who was once a professor before joining the OAU and the UN, and now back in academia, pointedly reminded me that as someone who has worked in both the AU and UN (as I continue to), almost everything I said on the OAU/AU applies, mutatis mutandis, to the UN as well: whether it is the anti-intellectualism, the fact that you are not supposed to claim credit for any papers that you produce, let alone put your name on it, the very suppression of the use of academic titles, the philosophy that the member States are king and queen and so the Secretariat is just that, that is, subservient to them and their agendas, the bureaucratese in which reports are to be written (forget the Chicago manual...), the fact that the majority of freeloaders are not uncomfortable with only a handful of states paying three-quarters of the budget (for the UN: US, Japan, Germany, etc.) but resist every attempt by the big contributors to influence all major decisions by the organization. All this is just as true of the AU as of the UN.

I point this out, so that I don't give the impression I am hammering away at the African Union and that your experience will be totally different in the UN. A standard education requirement for UN jobs in political affairs often reads as follows: "Advanced university

degree (Master's or equivalent) in Political Science, International Relations, Social Science, International Economics, Law, Public Administration or related fields. A first level university degree with a relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience may be accepted in lieu of the advanced university degree." In practice, this means (1) Ph.D. in Political Science is not really required, and (2) a young (or old) Ph.D. joining the organization without 'a relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience' could be hired as a P-2, which is the beginner's level.

Peacebuilding as Statebuilding – Implications for the UN

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Introduction

To discuss how the current research on statebuilding can or should inform on-going debates about the role of the UN in peacebuilding processes necessitates, as a first step, a look at the broader political context. Let me for the sake of brevity mention two aspects:

Dynastic v Popular Sovereignty

During the 1990s, the concept of popular sovereignty gained strength and gradually undermined the status of dynastic sovereignty. This was most clearly reflected in the so-called humanitarian interventions, as the international community lowered the threshold for interventions to protect civilians (some have referred to this shift as one from "juridical" to "empirical" sovereignty).

While this change was reflected in decisions about whether to engage in a particular situation to protect civilians, it has not – as I'll discuss in some detail below – resulted in a concomitant change in how the international community engages with recipient countries as they seek to re-build institutions and sustain the peace. The UN, for example, typically negotiates with and gives aid to governments (i.e. statebuilding), thus operating on the basis of a dynastic conception of sovereignty. True, since the 1990s the international community – the UN included – has invested rather heavily in civil society organizations of different types. But the modus operandi of the UN (and other donors) is tied to governments, often with a focus on the accountability from recipient governments to donors, at the expense of a focus on the accountability from the recipient government to its citizens (popular sovereignty).

Global Governance and the fragmentation of the aid architecture

The debate about the tenets of global governance typically revolves around how states have lost power vis-à-vis private actors, be they private corporations, NGOs or large philanthropic organizations. These "new" actors, it is often said, have generated a much more complex web of actors that are involved in global regulation and governance. Indeed, the term governance is used to signal a shift in the locus of power from governments to (networks of) governance involving a mix of different types of actors.

A related development is the fragmentation of the multilateral system as states resort to ad-hoc alliances and policy initiatives operating outside or in tandem with the UN and other International Organizations (IOs). This has become something of a mantra in development circles of late – where fragmentation of the aid architecture is seen as a serious challenge: China is entering development policy in Africa with its own strategic

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interests and does not want to be coordinated or harmonized with other donors; public-private partnerships are becoming powerful actors that (often) focus on "vertical" programs that deliver measurable and high visibility impact. The future role of the UN in peacebuilding will be heavily shaped by these developments as it concerns whether international development policy – peacebuilding included – will gravitate towards increased integration, coordination and harmonization with the UN in a key role, or towards a model where the proliferation of "new" actors and networks will continue to challenge established modes of doing development aid. While fragmentation of the aid architecture has many negative consequences – such as increased transaction costs and likelihood of even more duplication – there is also an argument to be made for the virtues of competition and of how these new actors operate: innovation, flexibility, or ability to learn.

The UN and Peacebuilding

Institutional set-up at HQ and lack of peacebuilding capacity/expertise

The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) have been met with high expectations. The purpose of the PBC – as laid out in the SG's report "In Larger Freedom" – is to help forge a peacebuilding strategy at the UN. Although it is too early to judge the PBC, the UN is characterized by a set of organizational challenges that the PBC – even if it does succeed in forging a peacebuilding strategy – will not be able to resolve.

A report issues by the Secretary General's Executive Office in September 2006 notes, for example, that: i) there is no agreed upon definition of what peacebuilding is among different UN entities; ii) capacity and expertise on issues relevant to peacebuilding are not defined and organized as such but are organized around thematic, sector-based issues; iii) expertise is developed and refined for reasons other than peacebuilding (and in stead for the promotion of different UN entities' special niches and mandates); iv) there is no integration between UN entities; and v) there is little ability to manage knowledge/expertise and learn lessons relevant to peacebuilding.

Even if the PBC will come up with a good strategy for peacebuilding, then, it will be of little help if the expertise and capacity of those UN entities that will have to implement this strategy is not geared towards peacebuilding but rather towards thematic issues – as laid down in UN entities' mandates and policy, be they de-mining, DDR, job creation, education or transitional justice.

To make peacebuilding at the UN work, therefore, it seems necessary to go beyond the call for more and better coordination at headquarters. One way to achieve this is to work towards a stronger element of functional centralization – streamlining the many UN entities engaged in development work and peacebuilding. There are 9 UN entities involved in DDR, 7 in transitional justice, 14 in gender, 9 in human rights. There is ample room for such functionally-based integration, even if the counter-argument (alluded to above) that relative autonomy and competition between different UN entities can foster creativity, flexibility and innovation has some merit. In the UN, however, the resources spent on turf-battles and duplication suggests to me that streamlining is the way forward.

Another and less politically difficult alternative would be for the UN to invest heavily in better systems for knowledge management, learning and expertise geared towards peacebuilding. Here, the PBC and the PBSO may potentially be central agents of change, particularly if they succeed with the two countries they now work on.

Decentralization of decision-making

If there is one thing that unites the last years of research on peacebuilding, it is that context is everything, that local knowledge is necessary for success, that without ownership by key local actors, there will be no sustainable peace. What are the implications of this for the UN? At the most general level, this suggests that more decisions and manpower should be transferred from New York and Geneva to the field. Geographical de-centralization, then, would be the solution to the challenge of building local knowledge, understanding the context, trying to build ownership over time, etc. This is politically difficult, however, as the debate about the relative position of HQ vs. Field goes back to the formation of the UN.

Other ways to make the UN mode of operations respond to these insights from the research on peace- and statebuilding is to: i) use expertise with local knowledge (hire locals, for example); ii) create incentives for staff to develop local, context-rich knowledge (as opposed to formal, model-based knowledge of, say, how to do DDR, reform judiciaries or other); and iii) change the project-based mode of operations so as to facilitate a more strategic and comprehensive outlook.

Statebuilding as institution-building vs. statebuilding as social contract

All formal organizations view their environment in a particular way: they define the realm they are to intervene in in a particular way, owing to its internal characteristics and the values in their political environment. For IOs like the UN, being a bureaucratic organization, the most important value that it is to uphold is that of sovereignty. For this reason, the UN is very much geared in how it operates towards governments. Here, the idea of peacebuilding as statebuilding goes hand in hand with the inclination of the UN to relate to and aid governments: statebuilding is about the building of formal institutions that can institutionalize political rule and govern a territory in a particular (liberal) way. Helping governments achieve this task is something that the UN (and other donors) know how to do: they have developed elaborate models and formats for negotiations, policy dialogue, budget-support, PRSPs, etc.. The mechanisms for accountability between donors and recipients have improved considerably due to these mechanisms.

The problem is – and this relates to the point made in the introduction about dynastic vs. popular sovereignty – that the UN has not been good at focusing on, and trying to build, good state-society relations, which is what is needed in the long-term to build a sustainable peace. In fact, this is one of the key problems with peacebuilding (and development aid in general): that statebuilding defined in terms of a strong and legitimate social contract between state and society has not been a priority. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is but one example of this: it has focused mainly on ownership defined as the recipient government's ownership to development policies and reform while downplaying society's ownership to their government and their policies (social contract). Peacebuilding as statebuilding may thus – because of its focus on the building of formal institutions rather than on – inadvertently lead to a further neglect of

trying to forge stronger and better mechanisms of accountability and communication between state and society.

World Bank and the UN

Debates about state- and peacebuilding and its implications for the UN should not proceed without due consideration of what is going on in other international organizations, particularly the World Bank. The Bank is, for all its flaws, the largest multilateral donor and a considerable source of knowledge and expertise. It has not been particularly good at dealing with weak or fragile states, not least because the International Development Association (IDA), which focuses on the poorest countries, allocates money based on performance (rather than need). The Bank has consequently not been big in fragile states, but there are signs that this is shifting. Recently, the Bank came out with a background report about the likely trends that will shape the Bank's operating environment. One of the key points was that weak and fragile states will be grow to become more important on the international development agenda, not least because good-performers will over time be in need of less aid from the Bank. A central challenge, then, is to get the Bank to devise a system for aid allocations that is appropriate to the task of (post-conflict) statebuilding. Another central challenge is to get the Bank and the UN system to develop better ways to work together in fragile states. Even if the UN were to become more effective, it would need the financial muscle that the Bank can provide.

Move beyond the one-size fits all-mantra

All policy documents on statebuilding/peacebuilding and development policy contain the phrase: "there is no one-size fits all." This is true, but for the purpose formulating better policy, we should move beyond this and ask how, practically, to avoid it and also where some elements of standardization may be a good idea.

Finally, a call for different type of research: Ethnographic research/Everyday peacebuilding

How do you build a state, or peace, on a daily basis? How do "everyday peacebuilders" go about their job? How do they use the guidelines, regulations and policies that are produced through political-diplomatic negotiations and specified by bureaucracies in New York and elsewhere? The typical response from practitioners in the field is that the guidelines, policies, and regulations issued by headquarters are often of little help in their day-to-day work. This is an important response – one that should, to my mind, be incorporated into policy-oriented debates about peacebuilding. To learn more about what works and what does not in different settings, there is a need, I think, to unearth and systematize the practical knowledge of those that work in the field. Debates about statebuilding- and peacebuilding policy operate from the basis of general, theoretical knowledge. This knowledge is important, of course, but it should be coupled with and supplemented by the practical knowledge that everyday peacebuilders possess. Why? Because that is where the action is, where decisions are made on what and who to support, who to trust, how to navigate in a political environment with many political agendas etc. Most importantly, this type of analysis would serve as a basis for institutionalizing, over time, a context-sensitive and practical knowledge within the UN that is critical to success in peacebuilding.

On Bringing in Ordinary People: Policy Suggestions from Post-Genocide Rwanda

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My research analyses the political activities of ordinary peasant Rwandans as they seek to understand and engage the state's policy of reconciliation after the 1994 genocide, in which more than 500,000 ethnic Tutsi were killed by ethnic Hutu. Specifically, it analyses the web of relations that a range of ordinary Rwandans have established with one another as they seek to rebuild their social and political networks in the aftermath of the genocide, under the formally democratic but oppressive rule of the minority Tutsi-led government. The research also explores the strategies that the state uses to frame individual options to reconcile and to limit how ordinary Rwandans are able to constitute self-help networks to deal with everyday social problems. In revealing the state's hidden institutional practices, the research finds that the Rwandan government's instruments of post-genocide reconciliation are in fact tools of domination designed to control a subordinate population, in this case the ethnic Hutu majority. The primary finding of the research is that state-led practices of reconciliation are not socially or politically integrative but are instead, by virtue of their qualities of coercion and exclusion, harmful to both individual security and state stability.

The research also brings to light some important lessons for international policy-makers and donors. When the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) captured power in July 1994, winning the civil war and stopping the genocide, many in the international community saw this as a victory of the Tutsi "good guys" over the Hutu "bad guys" (see, for example, Pottier, 2002, particularly chapters 1 and 3; Reyntjens, 2004, 2006). The post-genocide policies of the RPF-led government have not been seriously assessed by the international community because of the apparent peace and stability that RPF policies of state construction and social reconciliation have provided. Donor involvement in post-genocide Rwanda has focused on rebuilding the institutions of the state, and on state-led efforts to unify and reconcile a once-ethnically fractured society. This emphasis on the state offers few insights into an understanding about the interaction of local people with state policy, despite worrying trends of increasing authoritarianism and continued human rights abuses, including the continued muffling of civil society, strict censorship of the media and the intimidation of opponents and/or critics of the government. Most worrying is that international donors continue to sit on the sidelines despite awareness among their Rwanda-based representatives that the RPF is a wolf in sheep's clothing (Thomson, 2007).

Recent academic research has made the complicity of the international community -- evidenced in its continued financial and moral support of government policies of reconciliation and reconstruction – increasingly untenable. Kuperman (2004) shows how senior members of the RPF knew that genocide was a likely result of their unwillingness to negotiate at the Arusha Peace Accords in 1993 which not only challenges RPF narratives about its role in stopping the genocide but also the "good guy" status that it enjoys amongst international donors. Micro- analysis of individual motivations to

participate in acts of genocide from, for example, Fujii (2006) and Straus (2005) provide important evidence for policy-makers to critique and comment on the content and direction of the government's policy of post-genocide reconstruction. My own work shows that the post-genocide policy of reconciliation is based on incorrect assumptions about the nature of the killing by ordinary Rwandans and are, in part, structured to assign collective guilt to ethnic Hutu in ways that often precludes their participation in public life and can stigmatize them in their everyday lives. The policy world, however, either through naiveté or ignorance, chooses to overlook important academic insights that speak directly to critical elements of donor policy. My suggestions therefore concern: 1) the importance of bringing in the voices of ordinary peasant people as a source of information in understanding the effectiveness of post-conflict policies of reconciliation; and 2) the transfer of academic knowledge grounded in the experiences of ordinary peasant people for use by policy-makers.

Lesson One: The knowledge of ordinary peasant people matters

The knowledge of ordinary peasant people matters as ordinary men and women are the direct recipients of any intended (or unintended) benefits and consequences of policy. Their everyday experiences of coping, or of avoiding, engaging and/or subverting state-led practices of reconciliation can act as a barometer of potential success or failure, pointing to what works and what does not at the level of the individual and also alerting international policy-makers and state elites alike to the complexities of social reconstruction.[1] The Rwandan government has chosen to overlook the complexities of social reconciliation amongst a population fractured by genocide. It has declared publicly, and to an international audience of donors, foreign investors and tourists, that "Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated: [it is] a country whose past truly is the past, whose present is peaceful and politically stable, and whose future beckons ever more brightly with each passing year" (ORTPN, 2004: 4).   A focus on the lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans reveals a very different reality, one that suggests a superficial peace rather than the lasting and durable one proclaimed by the government. Witness this statement from a Hutu woman,

> "For me, the genocide is what happened after the killing stopped. I lost my husband and four of my children during the events. Now I suffer without hopes and dreams. My brother in prison, and I have no one to take care or to take care of me. I feel alone even when I am with other people. And then the government forces us to tell the truth about what we saw. I saw a lot of bodies but never did I see someone getting killed. I heard people dying but I did not see anything. How can I tell my truth when the government has told me what I have to say? I fear being sent to prison and I think now that my neighbours do not like that I live in [the same community as before the genocide]. Where can I go, what can I do? The government says Rwanda has been rebuilt but my life and home are still not repaired…."

These two quotes reveal the disconnect between the elite version of post-genocide Rwanda and the everyday lived realities of ordinary Rwandans. Bringing the lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans into the frame of analysis surfaces previously sublimated themes such as local power relations, social inequalities, diverse forms of Rwandan identity not based on ethnicity, and a consideration of the varied forms of political behavior that ordinary people exercise in post-conflict situations. Domestic elites and international policy-makers alike assume that local populations can be spoken

for because of their perceived powerlessness – ordinary people are the object of state power; they are not actors in their own right. The operation of power is more complex than state-centered analysis of power can possibly hope to illustrate; changing power relations between individuals and the state can be identified and understood when the experiences of ordinary people with the dictates of state policy are brought into the frame of analysis. This matters because patterns of state control and techniques of social and/or political exclusion can be brought to the attention of policy-makers, lest the best efforts of ordinary people at post-war reconciliation harm or hinder their everyday struggles of survival, of re-establishing livelihoods, of re-constituting social and economic networks, and of reconciling with neighbors, friends and even family members, get swept away in the name of state-based peace and security.

Lesson Two: Good research is informed by the everyday realities of ordinary people

One challenge in getting the considered attention of policy-makers to the importance of academic knowledge about post-conflict environments is that of how to successfully and safely gather the knowledge of ordinary people. Academic researchers can help policy-makers and practitioners as individuals who have already been in the field and who maintain a reflective "outsider" position on their analyses of local dynamics and complexities. My own research has been informed by an ethnographic approach, including participant observation and life-history interviews as ways to surface the previously subjugated knowledges of ordinary people. My work also does not aim at prediction, but instead seeks to render knowable the lived realities of ordinary Rwandans and to situate their current realities within a broader historical, cultural and institutional context. Such an approach can provide much needed background and context to harried policy-makers, lest they make uninformed recommendations that feed into the maintenance of "good guy/bad guy" dichotomies that characterize the winners (good guys) and the losers (bad guys) in many post-conflict situations.

A point of caution is necessary here. Academics and policy-makers alike must exercise ethical awareness when revealing the lived experiences of ordinary people. In the case of Rwanda, the government has predicated its international legitimacy on the perception that it has delivered state stability and societal peace through its various strategies and techniques of reconciliation. Voicing individual experience requires much more than intellectual discretion; it also requires a broad historical understanding of the social, political, economic and cultural dynamics that pervade state-practices of reconciliation so that truth statements can be evaluated and appropriately contextualized. It is also important so that politically sensitive material can be sufficiently contextualized or, when necessary, suppressed.

The purpose of testimony gathered through the life history interview format then is social change, with the "truth" being created through the telling of one's lived experience of, for example, genocide, displacement, imprisonment, intimidation and the struggle to reconstitute lives and livelihoods following the genocide. While this people-centered data is useful and important, it must also be made available to policy-makers in timely and appropriate formats. The life history method is time-consuming, and requires numerous so-called "sunk" costs for the academic, including language training, extended periods of fieldwork away from career and family, and the rigors of translating, transcribing and contextualizing the testimonial evidence gathered through life history

interviews (as well as other in-depth ethnographic methods).   Academics need to work with policy-makers to ensure that the results of locally-grounded, in-depth research is able to meet the needs of policy while policy-makers need to work with academics to ensure that research results are timely, appropriate, and sensitive to their operational limitations.

Lesson Three: Local elites are political actors too

In Rwanda, as in other post-conflict situations, policy-makers and/or donors are often posted for limited durations, lack institutional memory and are sometimes unaware of not only the local context but also of the historical complexities of the conflict. Academics can assist in informing policy-makers with advice and recommendations in plain language and grounded in extended fieldwork. Policy-makers often rely on the information provided by local staff, or through their desk officers who have spent little (if any in some cases) time in the field. Caution is drawn to the case where local staff are political appointments of the government of the day. Rwanda characterizes this to the letter where the RPF-led government has sought, with varying degrees of success, to populate the local-offices of international organizations such as, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and African Rights, with its loyalists. Academics and policy-makers alike are well-advised to remember that local staff exist in a specific social and political context; this is not to challenge or disrespect the professionalism of in-country counterparts, but is instead only to point out as that the knowledge gained through interaction with local elites should be weighed against other, competing sources of information, including observations gained through interaction with ordinary people, semi-structured interviews and casual conversations with folks in-country, both nationals and internationals, as well through careful analysis of the academic and policy literatures.

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